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VOIR DIRE OF JURORS: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS TO THE RIGHT OF INQUIRY INTO
PREJUDICEI
JEFFREY M. GABA*
Although the voir dire of jurors is one of the most significant
mechanisms by which an impartial jury is secured,' as a practical
matter the right to examine prospective jurors is not unlimited.
Vested with great discretion, a trial judge may at some point constitu-
tionally preclude inquiry into possible prejudice, but determining that
point has not proved to be easy. Appellate courts have generally
failed to adequately consider the concept of the impartial jury or the
particular problems of voir dire.' Thus, trial judges have not had a
principled basis on which to exercise control over the conduct of voir
dire.
In 1976, however, the Supreme Court in Ristaino v. Ross3 di-
rectly considered the constitutional limits to voir dire and provided a
test which could serve as a guide to trial court administration of the
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I. The impartiality of juries is a right guaranteed by the sixth, seventh, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution, in all American courts, state and federal,
criminal and civil. The sixth amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... " Although expressly
referring to criminal prosecutions, courts have held that the concept of the impartial jury is
implicit in civil trials provided by the seventh amendment. See, e.g., Kiernan v. Van Schaik,
347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965). Sixth amendment protections were made directly applicable to
the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), but even before direct incorporation,
principles of due process guaranteed a defendant in a state court the right to an impartial jury.
See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
2. In an analysis of. the impartial jury, the Supreme Court concluded: "Impartiality is
not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude
of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not
chained to any ancient and artificial formula." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46
(1936). Perhaps intimidated by the task of devising modern formulae, the Supreme Court has
avoided premising decisions on the sixth amendment. As one commentator noted: "It would
seem that the Court increasingly prefers to decide on broader grounds those issues arising with
regard to jury trials which by their nature constitute manifestations of the more far-reaching
social or political problems of the nation." F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (1951). Thus, the Court has preferred to rest its decisions
on concepts of due process and equal protection in areas such as the constitution of the jury
pool, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), exclusion of jurors for cause, Dennis v. United
States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), and even the parameters of voir dire, Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524 (1972).
3. 424 U.S. 589 (1976). See notes 72-94 and accompanying text infra.
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process. The Court suggested that questioning about prejudice must
be allowed only in situations where there is some "nexus" between
the prejudice feared and the issues likely to arise at trial. In reaching
this conclusion the Supreme Court made significant departures from
prior analyses of voir dire. Not only did the Court establish an ex-
tremely narrow. constitutional right to inquire into prejudice, but by
focusing on the issues at trial, rather than the prejudice of the venire-
people, it demonstrated an extraordinary tolerance with prejudice
among the jurors who decide a case.
While Ross may be a departure, its ultimate destination is un-
clear since its full significance will not be known until it is applied
by trial courts. The particular nature of the "nexus" required to
establish a constitutional right of inquiry is not yet certain, and al-
though a cursory reading of the opinion might suggest that there will
be only a limited right of inquiry, a deeper analysis indicates a much
broader right of inquiry might be available.
THE IMPARTIAL JURY
While the jury performs numerous and sometimes contradictory
functions in American society,' the "impartial" jury basically per-
forms but one: a reasonable determination of the facts.' In Estes v.
Texas,' Chief Justice Warren considered the impact of widespread
4. De Tocqueville observed of the American jury:
However great its influence may be upon . . . the courts, it is still greater on the'
destinies of society. . . . The jury is, above all, a political institution, and it must
be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated. . . . The institution of the
jury . . . invests the people . . . with the direction of society. . . . It imbues all
classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. . . . It makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society and the
part which they take in its government.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (New American Library ed. 1956). See
generally Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Broeder, The Functions of the Jury Facts
or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of
the Community, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 1417 (1969). While such functions range from an education
in citizenship to the prevention of corruption by prosecutor or judge, perhaps the most interest-
ing, and controversial, element of the jury's functions is the one most in conflict with its role
as an impartial trier of facts; it is the element of "nullification." Pursuant to this purpose, the
jury rather than being impartial is to inject the bias of the community and temper the applica-
tion of unpopular laws. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (1972).
5. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court concluded that the
purpose of the jury was to "prevent oppression by the Government. 'Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor and against the complaint, biased or eccentric judge.'" Id. at 100
quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1 68). The mechanism by which the jury seeks
to achieve this goal is by acting as the arbiter of "objective" facts-that is, by determining that
reality to which the abstract law will be applied.
6. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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publicity on the conduct of a trial. Reviewing the concept and purpose
of the jury in the Anglo-American system, he wrote: "Our common-
law heritage, our Constitution, and our experience in applying that
Constitution have committed us irrevocably to the position that the
criminal trial has one well-defined purpose-to provide a fair and
reliable determination of guilt." 7 Central to the achievement of that
purpose is the juror who acts as the "nerve center of the fact-finding
process."
For the individual juror to perform this function, he must, in
Lord Coke's phrase, stand "indifferent as he stands unsworne." This
concept of "indifference" embodies the'attributes thought to be nec-
essary for a juror to be impartial, and essentially it involves the
capacity to form judgments based solely on the evidence developed
at trial.'0 As Justice Frankfurter noted, it is the "free, fearless and
disinterested capacity in analyzing evidence which is indispensible if
jurymen are to deal impartially with an accusation."" The elaborate
evidentiary protections which have developed through the course of
the common law reflect this conception of a neutral, "sequestered"
jury which arrives at a decision on the basis of the evidence filtered
through the trial.'"
A completely impartial jury is, however, impossible. Prejudice
7. Id. at 565.
8. Id. at 545.
9. COKE ON LITTLETON 155b (19th ed. 1832). See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976); cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, §28
(West Cum. 1972) (which allows for the examination of a potential juror to see if he "stands
indifferent").
10. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). See also Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 290, 303 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gutman). In Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965), Justice Stewart wrote:
"The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial'
goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial
by jury." (citing the sixth amendment with emphasis placed on "impartial"). Reviewing the
prosecution of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall commented:
I have always conceived, and still conceive, an impartial jury as required by common
law, and as secured by the constitution, must be composed of men who will fairly
hear the testimony which may be offered to them and bring in their verdict according
to that testimony, and according to the law arising on it.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (No. 14,692g) (C.C.D.Va. 1807).
II. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12. As one commentator noted:
To the extent that evidence, and not juror bias, determines the verdict, the attorney-
conducted voir dire is compelled by the philosophy underlying the common law of
evidence; namely, that the jurors' deliberation must be limited to the evidence,
thereby preventing them from deciding on the basis of matters not properly before
them.
Gutman, supra note 10, at 303.
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is a basic component of every individual's personality, and this preju-
dice strikes at the core function of the juror by distorting perceptions
of evidence and influencing conclusions ultimately reached.13 While
judges may act as filters for the presentation of evidence, jurors
provide their own perceptual filters through which the data presented
to them must pass before a legal judgment is reached.
The legal system has slowly acknowledged the subtle effects of
prejudice," and various aspects of the jury system reflect attempts to
minimize its influence. External influences upon the jury are dealt
with in numerous ways ranging from actual sequestration to exclu-
sion of prejudicial evidence. 11 But internal influences-latent preju-
dices held by the individual and the community-are more difficult
to control. The major institutional protections against these internal
influences operate through the selection of the pool of potential jurors
and the removal of unacceptable venirepeople. These procedures re-
flect interesting psychological assumptions which the courts have
made about the operation of prejudice.
The selection of the venire panel is premised not upon the exclu-
sion but rather on the inclusion of a wide range of prejudices. Recog-
nizing the effect of bias, the courts have attempted to minimize its
influence by ensuring a random or balanced representation of con-
flicting biases in the general population of potential jurors. Thus, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the systematic exclusion of
an identifiable class of persons from the venire panel is a violation
of equal protection, due process and the right to an impartial jury.ll
13. Thus, no thing . . . can create an impression unprejudiced by associations
which already exist in the mind. In the light of such facts it is humorous to hear a
prospective juror say in examination that he has formed no opinions as to the merits
of the case, that he can sit as a fair and impartial juror. This is impossible. His
inherent, though possibly unknown prejudices make such impartiality impossible.
M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 60-61 (1926), quoted in Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Mini-
mum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493,
1496 n. 19 (1975). See also S. Freud, Psychoanalysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts
of Law (1906) in THE HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT 115 (1963); See also notes
46 and 88 infra.
14. If the courts are reluctant to relinquish belief in the human capacity for perfectability
and rationality, it may stem from the practical problems involved in acknowledging human
fallibility. See notes 36-48 and accompanying text infra. The legal system has accepted the
presence of jurors who have formed an opinion or are familiar with the evidence of a case as
long as "the juror can lay aside his impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). This legal conclusion
stems in large part from the recognition by the courts that under any other rule they would
not be able to assemble a jury. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50-51 (No. 14,692g)
(C.C.D.Va. 1807).
15. See generally Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960).
16. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
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Furthermore, as the appreciation of the significance of prejudice has
increased, this negative command has become a positive pressure to
ensure the inclusion of a broad cross section of the community. 7
Despite judicial reliance on equal protection, this insistence that no
group be excluded from the venire panel has not developed simply to
ensure the joys of jury service to all. Rather, the primary concern has
been with the effect of excluding groups with differing perceptions
and values. 9
Once the panel has been selected, the procedures for selection of
the petit jury which will try the case operates from a different, and
somewhat contradictory, premise. There is no obligation that a cross
section of the community be represented on the jury; 9 rather, there
is an attempt to exclude all those who have strongly held or extreme
prejudices. This is accomplished through the challenge system. Al-
though there is variation in the procedures by which the challenge
system operates, the federal system is representative of the general
theory.20 Opposing counsel are allowed to remove prospective jurors
either for cause or peremptorily, and it is the clash mandated by the
adversary system which is supposed to produce results close to fair-
ness.
A challenge for cause is based upon the bias of the prospective
juror. Under present analysis, bias can be either "implied" or
U.S. 217 (1946); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See also Kuhn, Jury Discrimi-
nation: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1967); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the
Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 1417 (1969).
17. [Slystematic exclusion of identifiable minorities from jury services has
long, been recognized as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, in more recent
years the Court has held that criminal defendants are entitled as a matter of due
process, to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. This
is an essential element of a fair and impartial jury trial.
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). In the federal system
this obligation has been enacted into law. "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants
in Federal Courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community." 28 U.S.C. §1861 (Supp. 1976).
18. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (allowing a white to challenge the unconstitu-
tional exclusion of blacks from jury service; the Court acknowledged the general harm that
follows from an improperly constituted jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (in
which the Court allowed a male to challenge the exclusion of women and wrote at length about
the different perceptions that women might bring to a jury).
19. See, e.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (applying the petit jury argument
in the context of the grand jury).
20. The federal rules for the conduct of voir dire are contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 47
and FED. R. CRIM. P. 24, under which prospective jurors may be challenged and replaced with
new jurors from a theoretically unlimited pool of veniremen. Representatively, similar state
procedures are contained in CAL. PEN. CODE §§1071-78 (West 1970); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24;
N.Y. CRIM. PRAC. LAW 270 (McKinney 1971). But cf. ALA. CODE tit. 30 § 54 (Supp. 1973)
(providing for the "strike" system in the selection of juries for civil trials, under which parties
alternate striking names from a list of prospective jurors until there are only 12 min left).
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"actual." Implied bias is often defined by statute,"1 and its operation
is based on the presumption that certain relationships between liti-
gants and prospective jurors are likely to result in the partiality of
the juror.2 Only the relationship need be shown, bias will be implied
by law. Although statutory and variable, the relationships typically
involve either family or finance."
Actual bias includes all other circumstances indicating a lack of
impartiality. In somewhat circular terms, the Supreme Court has
defined actual bias as the "existence of a state of mind, on the part
of the juror, which leads to a just inference in reference to the case
that he will not act with entire impartiality."24 If that state of mind
can be proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge, numerous preju-
dices can form the basis for this challenge. 5
There are, however, significant practical limitations on the effec-
tive use of a challenge for cause. Not only is it difficult to prove bias,
but there is reluctance on the part of judges to, in effect, "adjudicate"
an individual as being prejudiced. Furthermore, unsuccessful, and
even successful, challenges for cause can produce resentment among
the jurors.26
The peremptory challenge alleviates these difficulties by allow-
ing the removal of prospective jurors for any or no reason. "While
challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly speci-
fied, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremp-
tory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less
easily designated or demonstrable. ' 7 As the Supreme Court has indi-
cated, it is "an arbitrary and capricious right."" Although the consti-
tutional basis of peremptories is uncertain,2" the Court has recognized
21. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1074 (West 1970).
22. The reason for disqualifying a whole class on the ground of bias is the law's
recognition that if the circumstances of that class in the run of instances are likely
to generate bias, consciously or unconsciously, it will be a hopeless endeavor to
search out the impact on the mind and judgment of a particular individual.
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181'(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. Justice Frankfurter, after describing the logic of implied bias, wrote: "That is the
reason why influences of consanguinity or fiscal interest are not individually canvassed." Id.
24. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887).
25. See generally 72 A.L.R.2d 905 (1960) (challenge of jurors for racial, religious, eco-
nomic, social or political bias in civil trials); 54 A.L.R.2d 1204 (1957) (to the same effect in
criminal trials).
26. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503,
526 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Broeder]; Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards
to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1500 (1975).
27. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
28. Id. at 219, quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
29. Compare Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in
the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory chal-
lenges to defendants in criminal cases; a trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.")
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The right to an impartial jury is ultimately dependent on the
individual members of the community who are selected to sit as
jurors, and it is during the voir dire that the legal system first focuses
on the prospective jurors as individuals."' This questioning of pro-
spective jurors serves a three-fold purpose: (1) to determine whether
they meet statutory qualifications, (2) to determine the existence of
a bias which would subject a prospective juror to a challenge for
cause, and (3) to provide the information necessary to make an in-
telligent use of peremptory challenges."2 Although the procedure of
voir dire may vary among jurisdictions, a common factor is the
enormous discretion given the trial judge to control the process.3
Under the federal system, a judge has the discretion to decide
whether he or the lawyers will conduct the voir dire.4 If conducted
by the judge, the attorneys are allowed to submit supplemental
questions for the court's consideration, but again the judge has
broad discretion to determine what questions will actually be asked
of the venirepeople 5
The responsibility placed upon the trial judge reflects the enor-
mous practical problems involved in voir dire. "The reasons for vest-
ing the trial court with this discretion are obviously, first, to see that
voir dire examination actually is effective in obtaining an impartial
jury, and second, to see that this result is' obtained with reasonable
expedition. ' 36 While the major purpose of voir dire is, of course, to
with Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("The right to challenge a given number
of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused.").
30. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
31. While most of the information about venire people is obtained during voir dire,
there are other mechanisms. See J. MOORE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE Para. 24.03 n.7 (dis-
cussing government's use of a "jury book" containing the voting record of individuals who have
served as jurors); Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional
Process, 56 GEO. L.J. 839 (1969).
32. See Krueter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 656-57 (10th Cir.'1967); 2 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 382 (1969).
33. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRAC. LAW § 270.15(l) (McKinney 1971): "The scope of the
examination is within the discretion of the court, and the court may disallow statements or
questions by either party that are irrelevant to the examination or repetitious." Compare People
v. Buckner, 180 Colo. 65, 504 P.2d 669 (1972); State v. Dalton, 254 Iowa 96, 116 N.W.2d 451
(1962); State v. Oliver, 247 La. 729, 174 So.2d 509 (1965); Grogg v. State, 231. Md. 550, 191
A.2d 435 (1963); Darr v. Buckley, 355 Mich. 392, 94 N.W.2d 837 (1959).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
35. Id. See, e.g., Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1959).
36. The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 465-66 (1960).
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aid in the discovery and removal of biased jurors, 7 the process is not
without cost. Probably the major objection to voir dire is the amount
of time and money which is expended on the procedure." The ques-
tioning of prospective jurors can last for days and may even take
longer than the trial itself.3 9 With a growing concern for the conges-
tion of court dockets, such objections become increasingly signifi-
cant. Furthermore, there is a recurrent complaint that when lawyers
are allowed to conduct the voir dire they use the forum to ingratiate
themselves with the venirepeople and indoctrinate the jurors with
their theory of the case.4°
Perhaps there would be greater consensus that time should be
spent on voir dire if there were some assurance as to the usefulness
of the procedure. The conclusion of one empirical study was that the
"voir dire was grossly ineffective not only in weeding out
'unfavorable' jurors but even in eliciting the data which would have
shown particular jurors as very likely to prove unfavorable."', While
subtle and extensive questioning may be useful in uncovering latent
bias,42 such sophistication is rare.43
Extensive voir dire may be of limited practical significance in
any event. Venirepeople do not always tell the truth on voir dire-in
such a public setting there is the obvious temptation not to admit to
being prejudiced.44 Even if questions are answered with full honesty,
37. "The judgment that the court must exercise in finding 'disqualification for bias',...
is a psychological judgment." Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
38. See People v. Crowe, 8 Cal.3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973); Levitt,
Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916,
922-24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Levitt]; Craig, Erickson, Friesen & Maxwell, Voir Dire:
Criticism and Comment, 47 DENVER L. J. 465 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Craig].
39. See Levitt, supra note 38, at 923 n. 28. But see Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Mini-
mum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493,
1514 n. 91 (1975).
40. See A.B.A. Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function § 5.3; A.B.A. Standards
Relating to Trial by Jury § 2.4; Broeder, supra note 27; Note, Voir Dire in Federal Criminal
Trials: Protecting the Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 48 IND. L. REV. 267 (1972); note
38 supra.
41. Broeder, supra note 26, at 505.
42. For an example of involved and fruitful questioning on voir dire, see MINIMIZING
RACISM IN JURY TRIALS: THE VOIR DIRE CONDUCTED BY CHARLES R. GARRY IN People of
California v. Huey P. Newton (1969).
43. The records of the cases appealed to this court in which rulings made while
impaneling a jury have been involved, indicate that there is an increasing tendency
to prolong the proceedings inordinately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge
in tedious examination of jurors, apparently with no definite purpose or object in
view, but with the hope of eliciting gomething indicating the advisability of a peremp-
tory challenge, and that the supposed privilege of doing this has been greatly abused.
People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 753, 127 P. 58 (1912).
44. As it happened, one prospective juror in the Ross trial, when asked if he harbored
[Vol. 48
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studies indicate that there is often a considerable discrepancy between
attitudes held and behavior elicited. 5 Furthermore, despite efforts to
ensure that the venire panel represents a cross section of the com-
munity, this is often not the case, and the exclusion of a biased juror
is likely to result in the substitution of a person just as biased. One
study found that in selecting the venire panel "the result was usually
a largely homogeneous venire, not so much as to occupation or eco-
nomic status-though the occupation and income levels were consid-
erably above average-but as to basic values."4
Considering the doubts as to the usefulness of voir dire, one
begins to wonder about the practical significance of whether a partic-
ular question need be asked. But those doubts should not lead to the
conclusion that the problem in defining the limits to voir dire is
irrelevant. While voir dire may not be completely effective in discov-
ering prejudice, there are additional objectives, both proper and im-
proper, which it serves.4 8 Furthermore, it is still the primary mecha-
any prejudice, admitted to racial prejudice and was excused. However, one commentator,
reflecting on the limitations of voir dire, noted:
A lawyer simply cannot anticipate many of the factors in the jurors' backgrounds
which will affect their thinking and there is a broad area in which perspicacity will
not help anyway. Legal rules preclude many questions and other questions cannot
be asked because of the danger of offending. Again, veniremen do not always tell
the truth when questioned.
Broeder, supra note 26, at 505.
45. Studies suggest that people do not always act in ways which are consistent with the
attitudes that they express. Thus, in one famous study, 92% of motel managers queried by mail
stated that they would not serve Chinese, yet virtually all did provide service when a Chinese
couple personally requested to be served. See COLLINS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 80 (1970); B.
SEIDENBERG & A. SNADOWSKY, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 146 (1976).
46. Broeder, supra note 26, at 505.
47. A complaint often directed against voir dire is that lawyers use it to indoctrinate
jurors to their view of the case. See note 40 supra. One wonders whether questioning jurors
about their prejudices is likely to result in sensitizing them to the possible effect of prejudice
on their verdict.
The task of bringing the influence of prejudice to the attention of the jury is properly a
function of the judge. See, e.g., Dukes v. Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1976). One court
commented on this relationship between inquiry during voir dire and instructions from the
bench: "The government suggests that the court's instructions during the voir dire and through-
out the trial created an atmosphere of impartiality and reinforced the voir dire. Certainly there
are situations where instruction to an impanelled jury would cure weaknesses in the voir dire."
United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 368 n. 41 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973). But this does not confront the question of constitutionally mandated inquiry. Jury
instructions "can never be a substitute for essential inquiries into the areas of seemingly proba-
ble prejudice of the veniremen." Id.
While jury sensitization may not be a substitute for inquiry during the voir dire, if sensitiza-
tion is the actual objective of both lawyer and court, then analysis of the constitutional limits
to voir dire is incomplete without some consideration of this effect and alternative ways of
achieving it. It is possible that there is a broader constitutional obligation connected with jury
instructions than with voir dire.
48. Certainly the legal community does not consider voir dire to be irrelevant. See, e.g.,
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nism by which prejudicial attitudes are revealed" and is thus an essen-
tial-if imperfect-element of the challenge system.
Limits to Discretion Before Ross
Courts, in their analyses of the challenge system and voir dire,
have done little to provide a principled basis upon which a trial judge
may exercise discretion. Catch-phrases have been substituted for a
discussion of the issues involved. Thus, discretion is said to be limited
only by the demands of "essential fairness" and is reviewable only
for its "abuse." 50 While there is a consensus that a certain amount
of surface information about venirepeople must be made available,5
case by case treatment has produced little consistency.52
The Supreme Court has fostered this situation through its own
inadequate analysis. In the past it has suggested an open-ended prin-
ciple which contained few hints as to its limits. The Court appears to
have reasoned that if challenges for cause and peremptory challenges
are necessary to ensure an impartial jury, then freedom to question
must also be necessary to ensure the proper use of those challenges.
I BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS (1959); Bodin, Selecting a Jury (Prac. L. Inst.,
Trial Prac. 1948); GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE (1935).
49. See note 48 supra. See also note 40 and accompanying text supra.
50. "We recognize that there is no generally accepted formula for determining the appro-
priate breadth and depth of the voir dire, except that the court's discretion is subject to the
essential demands of fairness." United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), quoting Aldridge v. United States, 289 U.S. 308, 310 (1931);
accord, Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (dictum); United States v. De Pugh, 452
F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920 (1972); United States v. Napoleone, 349
F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965); Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Sellers v. United
States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
51. "Litigants . . . have the right, at the least, to some surface information regarding
the prospective jurors. Such information may uncover ground for challenge for cause. If it does
not, it will be available in the intelligent use of the peremptory challenge ... " Kiernan v.
Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 1965). Accord, United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1970); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201
(2d Cir. 1950) affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); State v. Oliver, 247 La. 729, 174 So. 2d 509 (1965).
52. Courts have repeatedly had to deal with requests to inquire into various prejudices,
and although the facts of each case may offer an opportunity to distinguish results, the conclu-
sions by the courts have not demonstrated great consistency. Particularly troublesome areas
of prejudice have included race (compare King v. United States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(requiring inquiry into racial prejudice in crimes involving criminal defendants) with Rivers v.
United States, 270 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920 (1960) (in which it was
not error to refuse to inquire into racial prejudice)), credibility of police testimony (compre
Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816 (10th Cir." 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916 (1959)
(requiring venirepeople to be asked if they would give more weight to police testimony) with
Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963) (in which
such inquiry was not required)), religion (compare Horst v. Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 55 P. 52
(1898) with Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967)),-and the insurance coverage
(see generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949)).
JURY VOIR DIRE
In Dennis v. United States,s" the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to government employees serving as jurors in the trial of
Communists. While the Court concluded that government service
was not per se a ground for exclusion, it indicated that actual bias
could always be investigated on voir dire. Justice Minton wrote: "The
way is open in every case to raise a contention of bias from the realm
of speculation to the realm of fact.54 . ..Preservation of the oppor-
tunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of defendant's right to an
impartial jury."" In Swain v. Alabama," the Court reviewed the use
of peremptory challenges and the right to obtain information for their
exercise. A broad right of access to information was suggested: "The
voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operat-
ing as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories. ...""
Analytical confusion is perhaps inevitable in a system which in
theory allows a juror to be challenged and removed for virtually any
demonstrable bias; it is hard to define limits when dealing with the
limitless human capacity for prejudice and self-deception. But judges
must make daily decisions in this complex area, and despite a lack
of legal or psychological principles, the cases suggest that two ap-
proaches were being used to provide some guidance to trial judges.
Per Se Rule. Obviously, the easiest approach to the problems of
voir dire is to always allow certain types of questions to be asked.
This approach has been suggested as a way of dealing with inquiry
into various possible prejudices of recurring concern,58 but it was only
in the area of racial prejudice that a per se right of questioning
seemed to have developed. In Aldridge v. United States,59 the Su-
preme Court reversed the murder conviction of a black man because
the trial judge refused to allow inquiry into possible racial prejudice.
A large number of federal circuits had interpreted Aldridge as creat-
ing a right to inquire into racial prejudice in all criminal cases where
the defendant was black. 0 Although the right to an impartial jury is
53. 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
54. Id. at 168.
55. Id. at 171-72.
56. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
57. Id. at 218-19.
58. In United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Judge Leventhal
indicated that he thought questions about prejudice should always be asked in "matters con-
cerning which either the local community or the population at large is commonly known to
harbor strong feelings that may stop short of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew
deliberations in fact." Id. at 381. These matters included, in addition to racial prejudice,
situations involving wagering, use of intoxicants, testimony of a person that he had lied to
another, and religious minorities. Id. at 381 n. 9.
59. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
60. See King v. United States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Grant,
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not in principle limited to the'exclusion of any particular prejudice,
the trend was to distinguish inquiry into racial prejudice from inquiry
into all other forms of prejudice.
Probability of Prejudice. It seems obvious that a significant fac-
tor in a judge's decision about the limits to voir dire is the probability
that questioning will actually discover prejudice, and courts have
consistently demonstrated a concern with the probability that a par-
ticular juror may be prejudiced. In his dissent in Ham v. South
Carolina,61 Justice Marshall acknowledged the state's interest in ex-
pediting trials, and concluded that this interest "bulk[s] larger as the
possibility of uncovering prejudice becomes more attenuated. '" ' In
United States v. Dellinger, 3 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit concluded that questioning on voir dire must be allowed "into
the areas of seemingly probable prejudice of veniremen." 4
The difficulty with this approach involves the determination of
when that threshold of probability has been reached. 5 Justice Mar-
shall, in Ham, suggested that the courts allow litigants to present
evidence showing how extensive a particular prejudice was in a com-
munity. Judge Leventhal, in United States v. Robinson,6 advocated
a similar general framework. He concluded that where certain types
of prejudice, such as racial prejudice, are generally recognized as
existing in a community, then questioning must be allowed:
When the matter sought to be explored on voir dire does not
relate to one of those recognized classes, it is incumbent upon
the proponent to lay a foundation for his question by showing
that it is reasonably calculated to discover an actual or likely
source of prejudice, rather than pursue a speculative will-o-
the-wisp. 7
Such a foundation would form the basis for a trial court's determina-
tion as to whether there was an adequate probability that a prospec-
tive juror was in fact prejudiced.
494 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d
1157 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Robinson, 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d It10 (4th Cir. 1970).
61. 409 U.S. 524 (1972).
62. Id. at 533 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1970).
64. Id. at 368 n. 41.
65. For some judges that threshold may be quickly reached: "So long as race prejudice
exists, even in relatively few persons, there is a substantial chance that one of those few will
appear in court as a venireman." State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 143, 120 A.2d 152, 154 (1956).
66. 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 381.
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Ham v. South Carolina
The analytical confusion which existed in the law regarding the
basis for evaluating the limits to voir dire was perhaps best reflected
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Ham v. South Carolina.8 Ham, a
black civil rights worker, was charged with possession of marijuana.
He claimed that the police were "out to get him," and although issues
of racial prejudice seemed likely to be involved in the trial, the judge
denied a defense request to ask prospective jurors certain questions
about possible prejudices. These included questions relating to racial
prejudice and prejudice against people with beards."
The Supreme Court found that the failure to allow questioning
into possible racial prejudice constituted reversible error. Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion concluded that, given the state's statu-
tory framework establishing challenge for cause, the failure to allow
inquiry into racial prejudice violated the due process requirement of
fairness. Significantly, this conclusion was not premised on due pro-
cess alone; the fourteenth amendment's special concern with preju-
dice against blacks was an essential element of the Court's holding.
The majority did not justify this decision in terms of the guarantee
of an impartial jury-Justice Rehnquist's opinion failed even once to
use the word "impartial." Rather, the conclusion was based on the
notion that "a principal purpose of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminat-
ing on the basis of race. ... "I"
The arbitrariness of this analysis was confirmed by the Court's
treatment of the request to inquire into prejudice against people with
beards. Prohibition of such inquiry was not error. The Court wrote
that it could not "constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice
against people with beards from a host of other possible similar
prejudices. ... 71 The distinction between racial and tonsorial prej-
udice was not made because the Court considered the latter prejudice
less likely to be held by a prospective juror. Nor was the distinction
made because the Court felt that prejudice against people with beards
was less likely to influence the jurors. Beards were not distinguished
68. 409 U.S. 524 (1972).
69. The relevant questions that were proposed were:
I. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the
defendant's race? 2. You have no prejudice against negroes? Against black people?
You would not be influenced by the use of the term 'black'? 3. Would you disregard
the fact that this defendant wears a beard in deciding this case?
Id. at 525 n. 2.
70. Id. at 526-27.
71. Id. at 528.
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because they were indistinguishable. Although Justice Marshall
would have offered the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate that
prejudice against people with beards was present in the community,
that approach was apparently rejected by the majority.
Ham must be considered the nadir of the Court's analysis of the
constitutional limits to voir dire. While the conclusion of the Court
was not unreasonable, the manner in which it reached that result was.
Not only did the Court reject Justice Marshall's general test which
focused on the likelihood that venirepeople held a particular preju-
dice, but it required inquiry because of a special historical concern
for racial prejudice. In so doing, the Court not only expressed an
unacceptably narrow view of the fourteenth amendment, it also ig-
nored the fundamental purpose of voir dire compelled by the sixth
amendment-the discovery of any prejudice that might affect the
impartiality of the jury.
RISTAINO v. Ross
In Ristaino v. Ross," the Court explicitly addressed the issue of
the constitutional limits to inquiry into prejudice on voir dire.73 Ross,
72. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
73. The case had a long appellate history before the Supreme Court finally reached the
merits of the issue. After Ross' conviction and affirmance on appeal by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1972), the
Supreme Court released Ham v. South Carolina. In Commonwealth v. Ross, 410 U;S. 901
(1973), the Court vacated and remanded the ease for reconsideration in light of Ham.
In Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810 (1973), the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed Ross' conviction concluding that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ham had been restricted to the particular facts of that case. Ross, unlike Ham, was
not a "special target for racial prejudice." Id. at 672, 296 N.E.2d at 816. While a judge must
make inquiry prior to voir dire to determine if racial prejudice seems likely to enter into the
issues of the trial, absent such issue a general inquiry into prejudice on voir dire will be
sufficient. See Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: Constitutional Requirements
and Policy Considerations, 54 B.U. L. REV. 394 (1974).
The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari and refused to consider the conclusion of
the Massachusetts court. Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973). Justice Marshall, in a
bitter dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, sharply disagreed with the Massachu-
setts court and the failure of the Supreme Court to grant review. See notes 80-82 and accompa-
nying text infra.
Considering a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
Ross' conviction. Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1974). Refusing to decide whether
Ham had announced a broad rule, the court nonetheless concluded that the "likelihood of
infection of the verdict (by racial prejudice) was at least as great as in Ham." Id. at 756. The
factors which the court considered important included the presence of a white victim and his
status as a security guard.
The dissent, worried about the "Pandora's box of potential evil" opened by the majority's
opinion, doubted whether, in fact, there was any relation between a proposed question about
racial prejudice and the "ultimate desideratum"-the uncovering of racial prejudice in prospec-
tive jurors. Id. at 758. See note 48 supra.
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a black man, was accused of assaulting a white security guard. Al-
though requested by counsel, the state court trial judge refused to
inquire into the possible racial prejudice of the venirepeople.7' In-
stead, he limited his questioning to the general inquiry, required by
state statute, into possible bias.75
The Supreme Court did not consider the trial court's actions to
be a violation of Ross' constitutional rights. Although the Court had
required similar questioning in Ham, that case Was distinguished on
the basis of its special facts. Because of Ham's civil rights activity and
his defense that he was being framed, "[rjacial issues . . . were inex-
tricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."7  In Ross, on the
other hand,
[t]he mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a
white man and the defendants were Negroes was less likely
to distort the trial than were the special factors involved in
Ham. . . . The circumstances thus did not suggest a signifi-
cant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial. 7
The Court held that constitutional demands of due process could be
satisfied by a "generalized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality
of the veniremen." 78 In a footnote, the Court suggested that while its
holding defined minimum constitutional limitations, a wiser course
would be to allow such questioning: "Under our supervisory power
we would have required as much (i.e. mandating inquiry) of a federal
court faced with the circumstances here. The States are also free to
allow or require questions not demanded by the Constitution.",,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented,' assert-
74. The question proposed by Ross was: "Are there any of you who believe that a white
person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person?" 363 Mass. at 667 n. 4, 296
N.E.2d at 812 n. 4 (1973).
75. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 instructs the court to question, upon motion
of either counsel, potential jurors as to possible bias including whether the potential juror is
"sensible of any bias or prejudice." In 1973, an amendment to the statute was added which
allows more particular questioning about bias if "as a result of the impact of considerations"
a decision may be influenced by factors including "possible preconceived opinions toward the
credibility of certain classes of persons." As one commentator has noted, the Supreme Judicial
Court's opinion in Ross would probably be consistent with the amendment since it was con-
cerned with the "impact of considerations." See Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire.
Constitutional Requirements and Policy Considerations, 54 B.U. L. REV. 394 (1974).
76. 424 U.S. at 597.
77. Id. at 597-98.
78. Id. at 598.
79. Id. at 597 n. 9.
80. Justice White concurred in the result reached by the majority but not in the logic.
He believed that Ham had announced a new constitutional rule creating a widespread obliga-
tion to allow questioning into racial prejudice on voir dire but that the rule should not be applied
retroactively. Id. at 599. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
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ing that the "promises inherent in Ham and Aldridge will not be
fulfilled."'" In his dissent from the original denial of certiorari in
Ross, Justice Marshall had written that in analyzing voir dire the
Court should not be concerned with whether the defendant was a
"special target of racism," but rather with the potential for revealing
the "bias of the particular jurors who try the accused."82 Referring
to Ham, Justice Marshall restated the analysis that the essential
demands of fairness, coupled with the special concern for race inher-
ent in the fourteenth amendment, required that inquiry into racial
prejudice be available in the trial of a black defendant.
The Significance of Ross
Since the distinguishing factors in Ham resulted in racial issues
being "bound up" with the conduct of the trial, the Supreme Court
seems to have required that a nexus exist between the prejudice feared
and the issues of a case. This is a test which seems tailored to the
special abilities of a trial judge familiar with the conduct and issues
of a trial. To this extent, the majority's opinion in Ross represents a
strong reaffirmation of the role of the trial judge in the determination
of the limits to voir dire. Unlike the opinions which preceded it, Ross
seems to be an attempt to provide practical standards by which a
judge can make the recurring decisions on the extent of voir dire.
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court's analysis re-
flected a radical departure from prior approaches taken by courts.
Not only did Ross reject arbitrary distinctions based upon the unique
status of racial prejudice in the Constitution, but by focusing on the
issues of the trial, rather than the possible bias of venirepeople, the
court virtually gave constitutional sanction to the presence of biased
individuals on a jury.
Racial Prejudice and the Impartial Jury. Ross may be clear on
only one point, but on that point it is very clear. The racial identity
of the defendant and victim in criminal cases is not constitutionally
determinative of the right to question venirepeople about their racial
prejudices. Various federal circuits notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court disposed of the contention that Aldridge and Ham had estab-
lished a per se rule which allowed inquiry into racial prejudice in
crimes of violence where the victim was of a different race than the
defendant.
In rejecting such a rule the Court appropriately divorced the
81. 424 U.S. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting).




analysis of voir dire from the fourteenth amendment's traditional
concern for blacks. Unlike Ham, the majority opinion in Ross was
premised upon the right to an impartial jury. Since threats to a jury's
impartiality can come from many sources, the Court acknowledged
that an acceptable analysis of the limits to voir dire could not be
dependent on the type of prejudice involved. The Court noted that a
per se rule allowing inquiry into prejudice
could not in principle be limited to cases involving possible
racial prejudice. It would apply with equal force whenever
voir dire questioning about ethnic origins was sought, and its
logic could encompass questions concerning other factors
... . In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitu-
tional considerations militate against the divisive assump-
tion-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn
upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the
choice of religion."
While the Court in the past has been more willing to make a "divisive
assumption" to ensure an impartial jury,84 the basic premise that the
right to an impartial jury is racially neutral should be beyond dispute.
Significant Likelihood. Judicial concern with prejudice has, in
the past, focused on the possibility that a potential juror might be
prejudiced, and such concern was the obvious result of a system which
allowed for the removal of a prospective juror upon the demonstra-
tion of virtually any bias. Thus, in Aldridge, and in Justice Marshall's
dissents in Ross and Ham, the focus was on the possibility that bias
existed among the jurors who try the accused.
According to the majority in Ross, the facts of that case did not
establish a "constitutionally significant likelihood" of prejudice."
Although the Court used familiar language, Ross represents a sub-
stantial departure from the analysis used in prior cases. Where other
cases had focused on the likelihood that a prospective juror was
prejudiced, the Court in Ross focused on the likelihood that factors
at trial would "intensify" any prejudice that was held by jurors and
83. 424 U.S. at 596 n. 8 (citations omitted).
84. In Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931), the government argued that it
might be detrimental to allow questioning of jurors about their racial prejudice. Chief Justice
Hughes responded:
We think it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquir-
ies designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No surer way could be
devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Id. at 315.
85. 424 U.S. at 597-98.
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thus "distort" or "infect" the trial. Such an analysis shows extraordi-
nary tolerance for the presence of biased jurors, for the Court has
indicated that the Constitution is not concerned with whether jurors
are prejudiced but rather whether prejudice, when present, will be
expressed and actually influence the jury's deliberations.
The test advanced in Ross is actually premised on a psychologi-
cal rather than a constitutional assumption. The Court con-
cluded-presumably by judicial notice since there was no cita-
tion-that cases which did not openly confront prejudice "were [less]
likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury
might harbor."" This assumption does make intuitive sense, and
there is some support for the concept in the psychological literature. 7
Perceptions and judgments are more likely to be affected when they
are directly involved with prejudices that are held. This psychological
assessment underlies the conclusion reached by the Court, and a
preoccupation with the test that the Court suggested-a concern with
the factual issues of a trial-should not obscure the more fundamen-
tal conclusion that it is the "intensification" of prejudice which
should be the significant factor in determination of the right of in-
quiry on voir dire.
The Future of Ross
The true significance of Ross lies, of course, in the manner in
which it will be applied by the lower courts. Given the Supreme
Court's analysis, the limits reached will inevitably be narrow. How-
ever, the narrowness of those limits will depend on whether the courts
simplistically follow the implication of Ross that some factual nexus
is required before questioning is compelled, or instead focus on cir-
cumstances which might produce an intensification of prejudice.
If Ross actually requires that there be an explicit involvement
of prejudice as an issue at trial then the constitutional basis for some
mandatory inquiry may effectively have been removed. It is very
likely that this interpretation will prevail, and the courts which have
considered Ross have certainly not read it as broadening the right of
86. Id. at 597.
87. Numerous studies of selective perception have indicated that those who are
"prejudiced" will misperceive data and have it conform more closely to thier biases. See, e.g.,
Vidmar & Rokeach, Archie Bunker's Bigotry: A Study in Selective Perception and Exposure,
23 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 36 (1974); Cooper & Jahoda, The Evasion of Propaganda,
23 JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 15 (1947); Kendall & Wolf, The Analysis of Deviant Cases in




inquiry." For example, in Dukes v. Waitkevitch,"9 the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit-the court that was reversed in Ross-
provided the first substantive analysis of the opinion. There, a
black man was accused of participation in a gang rape of several
white women, and the trial court denied a defense request to inquire
into racial prejudice on voir dire. It was contended that the sexual
nature of the offense constituted "exacerbating" circumstances
within the contemplation of Ross. The court of appeals responded:
We do no read Ross to accord leeway for such distinctions.
Cases suggested by the Court as similar to Ham are those in
which the charges and defenses explicitly implicate racial is-
sues, and not those which involve racial prejudice, by infer-
ence, through the identity of the parties. . . . While interra-
cial rape may be a classic category of racial prejudice, the
prejudice inheres in the identities of the parties and not in the
specific issues.A0
If the identity or "status" of the parties is not a ground on which
the right of inquiry will be premised then it is difficult to imagine
situations in which voir dire is constitutionally available. Apparently
blacks may not inquire into racial prejudice simply because they are
black, and bearded people may not inquire into prejudice simply
because they are bearded. While the status of parties can at times be
a significant issue in a trial,"' the Supreme Court may have, in effect,
88. In State v. Gibbs, 228 S.E. 2d 104, 105 (S.C. 1976), the court concluded: "The fact
that the appellant was black and the victim white was in no way involved in any issue in the
trial and the trial judge properly refused to inject the question of racial prejudice through
questions submitted by appellant." United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976) (no
"unusual circumstances" which would create a constitutional right of inquiry); United States
v. Floyd, 535 F.2d 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no showing of special circumstances that would re-
quire questioning into possible racial prejudice); People v. Caldwell, 39 Ill. App. 3d I, 349
N.E.2d 462 (1976) (defendant not a special target of prejudice); Thornton v. State, 31 Md.
App. 205, 355 A.2d 767 (1976) ("circumstances of the case" intensify prejudice); But cf.
United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing Ross for the propostion that a cer-
tain amount of surface information about venirepeople must be supplied and reversing a con-
viction for bribing an I.R.S. agent as a result of the trial .court's failure to allow prospective
jurors to be asked if they or their family worked for the I.R.S.).
89. 536 F.2d 469 (Ist Cir. 1976).
90. Id. at 470-71.
91. While inquiry into possible prejudice may not be constitutionally available when
problems of credibility relate solely to the identity of the party, see Gorin v. United States,
313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963) (no error not to ask prospective jurors
if they would give more weight to the testimony of a police officer), distinctions might be drawn
on the basis of how closely "identity" was involved with issues in the case. In Ross, the victim
was a security guard assaulted in the line of duty. While the trial judge did allow inquiry about
the prospective jurors' association with the police and private security agencies, it is possible
that if he had not allowed the inquiry it would have been constitutional error since the victim's
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restricted the constitutional requirement of voir dire to political trials
in which issues of class, ideology or race are explicitly involved. 2
If, however, the Supreme Court is concerned with factors that
will intensify latent prejudice, then it is possible to argue that numer-
ous factors tied to the conduct of a trial could be significant in deter-
mining the right of inquiry." Thus, the court of appeals in Dukes
may have misconstrued the basic holding of Ross. Interracial rape is
a situation likely to produce intense responses when racial prejudice
is present, and certainly it would be possible to present evidence to a
trial court of the psychological literature which analyzes the funda-
mental sexual implications of racism." To suggest that a black civil
rights worker charged with possession of marijuana is more likely to
have prejudice distort his trial than a black defendant charged with
participation in a gang rape of white women borders on the absurd.
To conclude that the explicit involvement of issues of prejudice
at trial is the only situation to which constitutional significance will
be attached is to create a "per se" rule of the most arbitrary sort.
Yet that may be the result of Ross. The limits to voir dire are now
dependent on the imaginative application of Ross by lawyers and trial
judges, and arguments which reflect an understanding of the purposes
of voir dire and the basic premise of Ross may help preserve the
courts' traditional concern with ensuring "essential fairness."
CONCLUSION
Determination of the constitutional limits to voir dire and the
identity as a security guard, though not his race, was a factual aspect of the trial. Similarly, in
United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1976), a case decided after Ross, and involving
an alleged bribery offer to an I.R.S. agent, the Court of Appeals reversed because the trial court
refused to allow the defendant to ask prospective jurors if they were associated with the I.R.S.
92. In United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973), the Court of Appeals, in reviewing the conviction of members of the Chicago Seven,
concluded that voir dire must include inquiry into prejudices directed at three of the significant
aspects of the case: Vietnam protest, youth culture-"hippies, yippies and freaks"-and atti-
tudes toward the police.
93. In fact, the Court of Appeals, in Ross, concluded that questions about racial preju-
dice must be asked because the circumstances were as likely as those in Ham to distort a trial.
The court further noted:
If a juror were prone to racial bias, we question whether it is reasonable to conclude
that he would confine that bias and its destructive effects on his impartiality, to cases
where the defendant was a civil rights leader. That the juror might be particularly
prone to vent his bias in such a case in no way supports the conclusion that he would
be an impartial juror in the absehce of such a special factor, as the due process clause
requires.
Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 756 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1974).
94. See, e.g., S. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTEL-
LECTUAL LIFE (1959). See also S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE (1975); D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
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right to an impartial jury involves a complex amalgam of competing
interests, but at bedrock rest certain assumptions about the nature
and operation of human prejudice. In Ross, those interests and as-
sumptions led to several basic conclusions. First, the racial identity
of the parties will not be sufficient, in and of itself, to require that
questioning into the racial prejudice of venirepeople be allowed. Sec-
ond, the focus for the trial court in determining whether inquiry must
be allowed will be on the nature of the trial and the issues presented
and not on the individuals who may act as jurors. Finally, the Court
expressed concern with factors that will intensify any prejudice held
by jurors and increase the likelihood that their function as fact finders
will not be adequately performed.
It remains to be seen how sterile and restrictive an interpretation
of Ross will evolve. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the narrow
construction demonstrated in Dukes will predominate. But that is not
an inevitable development, and application of the fundamental prem-
ises of Ross may yet produce a significant role for the Constitution
in the determination of the limits for voir dire.
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